

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

Mr. Cumming  
Mr. Arneson  
Mr. Evans  
Mr. McAfee

SECRET

RECEIVED DIRECTOR  
BUREAU OF  
INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

1959 JUN 29 AM 10 35  
June 26, 1959

6/26/59 INR

MEMORANDUM FOR: INR - Mr. Cumming

I attach the original of a memorandum from Mr. Smith to Mr. Merchant, June 25, suggesting that an urgent special NIE be undertaken in connection with time phased proposals which might be submitted at the Geneva conference.

EUR fully agrees as to the urgent desirability of this study as well as with the terms of reference proposed for it. Consequently, we hope that it will be possible for you to undertake this promptly.

Foy D. Kohler

Attachment

Memorandum of June 25 re.  
Berlin Moratorium

cc: S/P

EUR:FDKohler:sj

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	NND 877418
By	10/2/99
NARA Date	10/2/99

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

SECRET

document consists of 2 pages

1 of 5 Copies, Serial 17

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
— RECEIVED, DIRECTOR  
POLICY PLANNING AND RESEARCH  
BUREAU OF  
INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

(21)

1959 JUN 29 PM 46

June 25, 1959

INR

TO: EUR - Mr. Merchant  
FROM: S/P - Gerard C. Smith  
SUBJECT: Berlin Moratorium

At the Secretary's meeting yesterday I was struck by the differing views on the Free World-Communist Empire balance likely to prevail two and a half years hence. This seems to me one of the crucial issues in deciding whether to seek a two and a half year Berlin moratorium or a new but more permanent Berlin arrangement. If the Free World -- or, more precisely, the anti-Communist coalition -- will be stronger relative to the Communist empire in 1962 than it is today, then a moratorium could be in our interest; if we are going to be weaker, a moratorium could be dangerous.

I suggest that we ask Hugh Cumming to initiate an urgent special NIE to clarify this issue. The key question to be answered is "Would the US and its allies be in a better or worse position to negotiate over Berlin in 1962 than in 1959?"

In order to answer this question, the USIB would have to consider inter alia the effect on the West Berliners and the world generally of Allied agreement in 1959 to a two and a half year Berlin moratorium. Would this be regarded as an Allied victory or defeat? How would the West Berliners react to the certain prospect of another round on Berlin in 1962?

74. 762.20  
/6-2659

S/P:EGMathews:AVH

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED	
NND 877418	
By	LV
NARS, Date 11/22/89	